Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis by Robert E. Baldwin & Richard K. Green
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis
Volume Author/Editor: Robert E. Baldwin, ed.




Chapter Title: The Effects of Protection on Domestic Output
Chapter Author: Robert E. Baldwin, Richard K. Green
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5851
Chapter pages in book: (p. 205 - 232)7  The Effects of Protection on 
Domestic Output 
Robert E. Baldwin and Richard K. Green 
Raising the level of  import protection has become the standard gov- 
ernment policy to assist industries seriously injured by increased im- 
ports.  The  political  reasons  for preferring  import  restrictions  over 
alternative means of assistance, such as subsidizing domestic produc- 
tion or providing adjustment assistance to workers and firms, are not 
hard to understand. The benefits of protection are concentrated on the 
injured industry,  whereas the costs are usually thinly spread over a 
large number of  users of the protected product. Furthermore, unlike 
subsidies, no unpopular budgetary costs are involved, nor does pro- 
tection, in contrast to adjustment assistance, send the unpopular mes- 
sage to the affected industry that the government thinks a decline in 
the number of firms and employed workers is appropriate. 
A well-established body of partial equilibrium analysis demonstrating 
the output-increasing effects of import protection reinforces the pref- 
erence of governments and import-injured industries for this policy. In 
the standard competitive model of profit-maximizing behavior, a tariff 
increase in an industry producing a homogeneous product enables do- 
mestic firms to increase output and capture a larger share of the home 
market by raising the costs of delivering the product from foreign com- 
pared to domestic production sources. If the product is differentiated, 
the increased delivery price of the variety produced abroad acts to shift 
demand toward the domestic substitute. The same expansion of do- 
mestic output also occurs in oligopolistic models under such commonly 
assumed conjectural behavior as Cournot-Nash or Bertrand. 
Robert E. Baldwin is Hilldale Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin- 
Madison and a research associate of  the National Bureau of Economic Research. Richard 
K. Green is a Ph.D. candidate in  the  Department of Economics  at the  University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. 
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There is also a body of analysis, however, utilizing a more general 
equilibrium framework, that points out the ineffectiveness of import 
protection in stimulating domestic production under some conditions. 
Metzler (1949) demonstrates, for example, that, if  the income effects 
associated with price changes are taken into account, protection may 
not  accomplish  its intended purpose. Specifically, if  the sum of the 
elasticity (in absolute terms) of foreign demand for the exports of the 
tariff-imposing country and that country's own marginal propensity to 
spend on imports is less than unity, the domestic price of the protected 
good will decline and thus act to reduce rather than increase domestic 
production.  I 
Baldwin  (1982) analyzes a  number of  situations  in  which  certain 
protection effects that are usually ignored in the standard partial equi- 
librium analysis cause a smaller-than-expected  increase in home pro- 
duction.  Under  conditions  often  satisfied,  introducing  quantitative 
restrictions induces a shift in the product mix of foreign suppliers to- 
ward higher-priced varieties of the protected product.2  Thus, since the 
value of imports in the protecting country falls less than the quantity 
of imports, the value of domestic output and employment increases 
less than is expected and, in particular, less than if an ad valorem tariff 
had been used to  reduce the total quantity of imports to the same level. 
Even when foreign firms shift production to the tariff-imposing country, 
the output-increasing benefits often accrue to firms and workers other 
than those that were injured by increased imports. 
Another response that weakens the domestic output-increasing ef- 
fects of protection  is importing the protected  product in either a less 
or more processed form than is covered by the protectionist  action. 
Switching to substitute products is still another means by which con- 
sumer responses lessen the price-increasing and, thus, output-increasing 
effects of protection. 
Protection will have no output-increasing  effects at home when  a 
quota on a homogeneous good is imposed selectively against suppliers 
in only a few foreign countries, and this quota, plus the quantity of the 
import good initially supplied in world markets by producers in non- 
affected countries, is greater than the import demand of the restricting 
country. The latter producers merely shift to supplying the market of 
the restricting country, while producers in the country against which 
the selective quota is imposed shift their exports to other countries. 
Even when these required conditions are not  satisfied, the selective 
quotas may have a very limited effect on domestic production due to 
transshipments through nonquota countries or the transfer of produc- 
tion facilities to these countries. 
Recent theoretical work analyzing international behavior in imper- 
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may not lead to the increased domestic production expected on the 
basis of  the standard competitive model. Assume, for example, that 
foreign producers of differentiated products that compete with similar 
domestic products have incurred  substantial sunk costs in  setting up 
distribution and service systems abroad and  in acquiring knowledge 
about the foreign government’s relevant  regulations.  While some of 
these costs can be recouped if  the foreign firms reduce foreign sales, 
others cannot be recovered. Consequently, when temporary protection 
increases their costs of selling abroad, these foreign firms may decide 
that the best policy in the long run is not to raise their prices and suffer 
a decline in market share abroad as domestic producers expand ca- 
pacity, but instead to accept lower profits and maintain their market 
position. Yet these firms would not have initially expanded production 
and entered the domestic market so extensively had profits originally 
been  at this lower level.  Hysteresis  in  trade  has occurred  (Richard 
Baldwin 1986),’ and the reduction in imports expected under the com- 
petitive paradigm does not OCCU~.~ 
In  some circumstances,  the long-term profit prospects for the do- 
mestic industry may be so unfavorable that even if foreign supply does 
decrease and domestic profits rise, local firms do not utilize the in- 
creased profits to expand their output. Instead, managers of  firms in 
the protected industry invest the profits in other industries. 
Other writings that deal with the ineffectiveness of protection include 
Bhagwati and Hansen’s (1973) analysis of how smuggling in response 
to protection can prevent the attainment of the desired level of domestic 
production, and Bhagwati and Srinivasan’s (1980) analysis of the ways 
in which lobbying for protection or for obtaining the revenues resulting 
from protection may reduce domestic output in the protected sector. 
The foregoing summary of the standard economic analysis of  pro- 
tection  and also of  the literature indicating why  protection  may  be 
relatively ineffective in increasing domestic output suggests that em- 
pirical investigation of  whether an increase in protection leads to in- 
creased  domestic output  in  the  protected  industry  is  a worthwhile 
research topic. We  use two approaches in carrying out such an inves- 
tigation. The first involves examining reports by the International Trade 
Commission on the probable economic effect on a domestic industry 
if  import relief is terminated. These reports invariably assess the ef- 
fectiveness of the protection that had been granted and indicate if the 
commission finds any evidence in individual cases that supports the 
above analysis as to why protection  may prove relatively ineffective 
in stimulating domestic output. We  discuss the assessments of the com- 
mission on this matter in section 7.1. 
Sections 7.2,7.3, and 7.4  describe the more formal approach used to 
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and time-series data on output and protection levels within different in- 
dustries.  Specifically, section 7.2  outlines  the  vector autoregression 
model used to test the hypothesis that a change in the level of protection 
in an import-competing industry does not cause a change in the level of 
domestic output in the industry. Section 7.3 describes the estimation 
techniques, section 7.4 presents the estimation- and hypothesis-testing 
procedures, and section 7.5 discusses the data and testing results. The 
last section draws some conclusions from the two approaches used to 
study the effects of protection on domestic output. 
We  wish to stress that in using vector autoregression techniques we 
are not attempting to draw causal inferences without relying on a priori 
theory, a procedure that has recently been criticized by Learner (1985). 
On the basis of a well-established economic model, one can hypothesize 
that increases in protection in an industry regularly precede increases 
in output in the industry. Failure to obtain statistical support for the 
null hypothesis is consistent with an economic model in which protec- 
tion causes an increase in industry output. Such a finding, by itself, 
does not, as Learner stresses, tell us anything about the direction of 
causality between protection and ~utput.~ 
7.1  An Analysis of Section 203 Cases 
Sections 201-3  of the Trade Act of 1974 specify the conditions under 
which an industry can obtain relief from injury caused by import com- 
petition.  Representatives of  the industry first file a petition with the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) seeking a finding of serious in- 
jury (or threat of serious injury) due to increased imports. If  the ITC 
makes an affirmative determination, the president is directed to provide 
import relief for the industry unless he or she determines that such a 
step is not in the national economic interest of the United States. When 
the national interest condition is satisfied, the protection provided by 
the president  must  not  exceed five years  and must  be  sufficient to 
prevent or remedy serious injury or the threat thereof to the industry 
in question and to facilitate the industry’s orderly adjustment to new 
competitive conditions. 
Under the provisions of  section 203, the president can extend pro- 
tection for three years beyond the period for which import relief was 
initially granted, but first must take into account the advice of the ITC 
based on its study of the probable economic effect on the industry of 
the termination of the import relief.6 
There have been thirteen section 203 reports under the Trade Act 
of  1974. In eight of these a majority of  the commissioners concluded 
that termination of import relief would have an adverse effect on the 
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commission determined  that termination  would not  adversely affect 
the industry and recommended an end to import relief, while in one 
case the vote was evenly split. This section discusses the commission’s 
views on whether the types of  offsetting responses to protection de- 
scribed in the introductory section did occur in the cases investigated 
and, if they did, how important they were in rendering the initial pro- 
tection ineffective. The views of other economists who have examined 
these protectionist experiences will also be considered. 
7.1.1  Color Television Sets 
Almost every report mentions responses that have tended to offset 
the output-increasing effects of increased protection, in some cases to 
a significant degree. As would be expected, protection was often the 
least effective when it involved selective quantitative restrictions, as 
in the example of the protection granted the domestic color television 
industry. In 1977 the U.S. government negotiated an orderly marketing 
agreement (OMA) quantitatively  limiting Japanese exports of  color 
television receivers and subassemblies thereof to the United States to 
about 70 percent of Japan’s  1976 level. As a result, Japan’s share of 
the U.S. market fell from 18.7 percent to  10.8 percent between  1976 
and 1978. 
But there was a fourfold increase in exports of color television sets 
from Taiwan and Korea, with their share rising from 1.5 percent to 7.2 
percent in the same period, and the net result was that the import share 
from all sources only declined from 21.3 percent to 20.9 percent (Morici 
and Megna 1983, 19). Accordingly, the Carter administration negotiated 
OMAs with both Taiwan and Korea that became effective in 1979. That 
dropped the import share from all sources to 13.7 percent in 1979. But 
imports from Mexico and Singapore continued to rise during the period; 
their  share of  imports  of  complete and  incomplete color television 
receivers increased from 16 percent in 1976 to 37 percent in 1979, while 
the share of the countries covered by the OMAs fell from 82 percent 
to 59 percent (ITC Report, 203-6,  1980, A-12). 
Since unlimited imports of  some subassemblies were allowed, an- 
other effect of the protection was to increase Japanese and Taiwanese 
investment in assembly facilities in the United States (ITC Report, 201- 
6, 1980,6). Imports of subassemblies not covered by the OMAs doubled 
between  1976 and 1979. Production of the two largest U.S.  producers 
fell, however  (ITC Report,  203-6,  1980, A-18).  Thus, as Hufbauer, 
Berliner, and Elliott (1986,  220) conclude, the overall impact of  the 
OMAs on the injured firms was limited because of the shift in supply 
sources and the change in  the composition of  imports. The ITC rec- 
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7.1.2  Nonrubber Footwear 
The government negotiated OMAs with Taiwan and Korea in  1977 
to protect the domestic nonrubber footwear industry. As in the color 
television case, a  significant increase in  imports from  noncontrolled 
countries followed. While the volume of imported nonrubber footwear 
from Taiwan and Korea declined from 225 million pairs to 148 million 
pairs in the year after the OMA went into effect, imports from other 
sources increased from 142 million pairs to 225 million pairs (ITC Re- 
port, 203-7,  1981, A-8). To circumvent the quantitative restrictions in 
1978, exporters from Taiwan allegedly tried transshipping through Hong 
Kong, but the practice was curtailed by requiring certificates of origin. 
With the increase in imports from noncontrolled sources, the total U.S. 
import share by volume increased from 47.0 percent in  1976, the last 
year before import restraints, to 51.0 percent in 1981, the last year of 
the restraint period, even though the import share of Taiwan and Korea 
fell from 25.4 percent to 22.0 percent between these years (Hufbauer, 
Berliner, and Elliott  1986, 210-  11). 
Significant  quality  upgrading  by  Taiwanese and Korean footwear 
exporters also occurred and served to reduce the impact of protection 
on domestic employment (Aw and Roberts 1986; Chang 1987). This is 
evident from the increase in  the value  share of imports from these 
countries in the U.S. market from 9.0 percent in 1976 to 13.1 percent 
in 1981, in contrast to a decline in their volume share from 25.4 percent 
to 22.0 percent between these years. 
Still another response that weakened the positive effect of protection 
on the domestic industry was a manufacturers’ change in the compo- 
sition of athletic shoes that shifted their U.S. Customs classification 
from nonrubber footwear, on which quantitative restrictions were im- 
posed, to noncontrolled rubber footwear. To be classified as  nonrubber 
footwear, the upper part of footwear must be composed of more than 
50 percent leather. Foreign producers simply changed the ornamental 
stripes on  jogging shoes from leather to vinyl, thereby qualifying them 
for classification as rubber footwear. The domestic industry estimated 
that 55 million pairs of jogging shoes entered the United States through 
this loophole in 1978 (ITC Report, 203-7, 1981 A-10). 
While the more rapid increase in the ratio of imports to consumption 
after decontrol in 1982 than during the control period suggests that the 
quantitative control had some restraining effect, the gradual rise in the 
import penetration ratio during the restraint period and the concomitant 
appreciable decline in domestic output and employment can hardly be 
regarded as a fulfillment of the president’s presumed intention to “pre- 
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7.1.3  Ceramic Tableware 
Protection provided to the ceramic tableware industry is an example 
of import relief that became progressively less effective due to foreign 
suppliers shifting toward higher-priced import categories not covered 
by the escape clause action. For the first three years after the president 
granted import relief in 1972 by sharply increasing duties, this shift was 
modest but  enough to prevent  the import/consumption ratio for all 
earthen table and kitchen articles from falling. The ratio stood at 55 
percent in 1971,57 percent in 1972, and 58 percent in 1975 (ITC Report, 
203-1, 1976, A-43). The recession of  1974-75  reduced the consumption 
of earthen tableware, but the import decrease between  1972 and 1975 
in items covered by the escape clause action was 58 percent compared 
to only  17  percent for the products on which tariffs were not raised. 
Domestic shipments declined by  19 percent. 
During 1976 and 1977, when total consumption of earthen table and 
kitchen  articles  increased appreciably,  the shift toward  noncovered 
items became so pronounced that the commission concluded that the 
probable effect on the industry of terminating the protection would be 
“minimal”  (ITC Report, 203-4,  news release). Imports of protected 
articles declined by 85 percent between 1975 and 1977 whereas imports 
of  nonprotected varieties increased by  87  percent. The import pene- 
tration ratio for all  earthen table  and kitchen  articles rose from 58 
percent in 1975 to 69 percent in  1977, with protected items making up 
only 9 percent of total imports in 1977 in contrast to 28 percent in 1972 
(ITC Report, 203-4, 1978, 40). Domestic shipments declined 2 percent 
between  1975 and 1977, while domestic consumption rose 35  percent. 
As a result of inflation in 1976 and  1977, an increasing percentage of 
imports originally subject to higher duties entered under noncovered 
higher value import categories (ITC Report, 203-4, news release).’ 
7.  I .4  Bolts, Nuts, and Large Screws 
Interestingly, the lack of substitution between imports and domestic 
production was the basis for the ITC’s recommending termination of 
the 1979 tariff increase on bolts, nuts, and large screws. A majority of 
the commissioners, backed by  an econometric study done by the ITC 
staff, concluded  that “imposition  of  import relief in  1979 appears to 
have had at most a minor effect on import levels and domestic pro- 
duction” (ITC Report, 203-1 1,  1981, 9). 
7.1.5 
The protection of domestic producers of stainless steel and alloy tool 
steel in the late  1970s by  quantitative import  restrictions illustrates 
Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel 212  Robert E. BaldwWRichard K. Green 
another problem associated with protection, that in helping one indus- 
try,  a  restriction  may  injure another. Users of  specialty  steel were 
forced to hold larger inventories than prior to the quota system because 
of the surge of imports of specialty steel at the beginning of each quota 
period when foreign suppliers rushed to fill their country quota. These 
steel consumers complained that the higher financing and storage costs 
reduced the competitiveness of  their end products with  similar im- 
ported  products (ITC Report, 203-5,  1979, A-14). The upgrading  in 
product mix  by  foreign  suppliers  had  a  similar effect.  Foreign  steel 
producers reduced their exports of steel used to manufacture cutting 
blades, thereby forcing domestic manufacturers of cutting blades to 
purchase higher-priced domestic tool steels, putting them at a disad- 
vantage vis-a-vis foreign competitors. 
The U .S. stainless steel wire-producing  industry was also severely 
affected by a shift in the product mix of  imported steel. Wire is drawn 
from stainless steel rods, which were covered by the quota. The in- 
crease in the price of steel rods caused by the quota raised  the pro- 
duction costs of  domestic wire  suppliers  and  led  to an increase in 
imports of wire. Thus, as the commission report stated, “The result 
is that the U.S. stainless steel wire-producing industry is caught be- 
tween tight supplies and rising prices of its raw material, which is under 
quota, and increased availability and more favorable prices from im- 
ports of its end product, wire, which is not under quota” (ITC Report, 
Even though there were these consumer problems with the quanti- 
tative restrictions, the commission staff concluded on the basis of its 
own econometric study that, while U.S. business expansion was the 
most important cause for the expansion of domestic output in the first 
year of the quota system (1977), the contribution of the import restraint 
program approached about half that of the business cycle. 
203-3, 1977, A-36). 
7.1.6  Some Conclusions 
A  review of  section  203  cases supports the view  that market  re- 
sponses to protection  sometimes significantly undermine its intended 
purpose of remedying the injury caused by increased  imports. Such 
seems to have occurred in the television, footwear, and ceramic table- 
ware cases. A more formal test of this proposition is undertaken in the 
next three sections, but  some conclusions about situations in which 
protection is likely to be less effective can be drawn from the section 
203 cases. 
The television and footwear cases illustrate the problem of trying to 
increase domestic production by imposing selective quantitative  import 
restrictions. Domestic producers are attracted to this approach because 
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having to deal with the opposition of foreign suppliers whose exports 
to the country have not increased significantly and who would be in- 
jured themselves by  a general cutback in imports, which government 
officials also appreciate. Even the country being discriminated against 
often does not object strongly because its producers receive the windfall 
gain associated with quantitative restrictions.  The possibility of  up- 
grading and shifting production to noncontrolled countries also helps 
to reduce its objections. 
Yet, once there is acceptance of  the principle of  imposing import 
restrictions against only those countries from which imports have in- 
creased significantly, protection is likely to be ineffective during the 
often lengthy period of lobbying by the affected industry for protection 
from one country after another as production expands in noncontrolled 
countries. Both firms and workers are likely to believe that protection 
will  work, and they tend to postpone the hard adjustment decisions 
that eventually must be made. 
As the ceramic tableware case illustrates, a similar problem arises 
from changes  in the import relief provisions  of  U.S. trade  law that 
enable an industry to be defined narrowly. It is easier for a group of 
domestic firms competing with a selected set of products  being im- 
ported in  significantly greater quantities to show serious injury when 
the industry is"1ess broadly defined. But the firms often discover that 
there is such a high degree of substitutability between the items covered 
by  the protectionist action and other items covered by a broader def- 
inition of the industry that they are unable to increase their output and 
employment after receiving protection. The time elapsing before all the 
relevant products are covered by a protectionist action often seems 
longer than if the firms had waited until the entire industry was threat- 
ened with serious injury. 
7.2  The Econometric Model 
We now turn to a more formal approach for investigating the efficacy 
of protection: we use vector auto-regression techniques to test whether 
changes in  protection from  1972 to 1982 in five major industries reg- 
ularly preceded changes in output in these industries. 
Consider the detrended variables x and y, which have many observa- 
tions. The variable x is said not to "Granger-cause''  the variable y if 
(1)  E{Y, :  ~r-I,~r-zr  . . .  9  YI,  ~1-13  xr-2,  . . . 9  XI) = 
E(Yr :  ~r-1,  ~t-29  . . . 7  YI>, 
where E{y:0)  is the linear least-squares projection of  y  on the infor- 
mation 8.  Thus, if  given the history of the y  process, the history of 
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predict, or to use Granger’s  (1969) terminology,  “cause”  y. This is 
tantamount to  saying that knowledge of the future of x gives us no 
knowledge of the future of y.* 
To test empirically whether x “causes” y, we first estimate the equation 
m 
Yr = a<>  + c a1yr-1 
/=I 
n 
where the a’s and 6’s are parameters and  the lag lengths m  and  n 
are sufficient to assure that {ur};-,  is a white noise process. We  then 
use an F-test to test the hypothesis  S1 = ?i2  = . . . = 6,  = 0. Should 
we reject this hypothesis, we cannot say that x does not  “Granger- 
cause”  y. 
For these tests to have sufficient power to be meaningful, large num- 
bers of observations of x and y  are needed. We  have eleven years of 
consistent annual data of output, and tariffs at the four-digit SIC in- 
dustry level; this is not enough observations for individual industries 
to test for Granger causality using the method outlined above. To over- 
come this problem,  we can create panels at the two-digit level, with 
observations x,,’s,  where i represents an observation on an industry at 
the four-digit level of  detail, and t  represents an observation on one 
year. 
Obviously, looking at a panel multiplies the number of observations 
available  for an individual  industry.  The procedure for determining 
Granger causality using panel data is not, however, a straightforward 
application of the model described above. Specifically, we must con- 
sider the impact of the individual characteristics  of the various four-digit 
industries on their response to protection, and we therefore may not 
stack all the time series-cross  section observations to estimate equa- 
tion (2). Moreover, the problem of testingfor Granger causality renders 
inappropriate many standard models of handling panel data. 
We  therefore use the techniques developed by Chamberlain (1983) 
and Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1985), and follow the exposition 
of these authors to describe the model we use. Consider a panel with 
N  cross-sectional  units observed over T periods, and let i index the 
cross-sectional observations and t the time periods. Because each cross- 
sectional unit has individual characteristics, we change equation (2) to 
(2a) 
m 
YIY = f; + a,  + c a/  YiI  / 
/=I 
n 
+ c  6Xx,r  k  + u,r  9 
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where .6. represents the individual characteristic of cross-sectional unit 
i.  The common practice for estimating equation (2a) is to difference 
the data to eliminate f; and then use ordinary least-squares (OLS) or 
generalized least-squares (GLS) on the equation: 
(3) 
+ uir -  Uir-1 . 
The flaw  with  this  approach  in our context  is evident.  Because yi, 
depends on uit,  the error term (uir - uifPl)  is correlated with the re- 
gressor (yir -  yitP1),  so any estimate produced using OLS or GLS on 
this equation will be biased. 
We  shall use instrumental variables to eliminate this problem. But 
before discussing the procedure we use to instrument out the bias, we 
should consider another problem with equation (3)-heteroskedasticity. 
Equation (3) specifies that the parameters are constant not only across 
different  units  but  also across time.  It also specifies that individual 
characteristics  are time-invariant.  Such a specification is needlessly 
limiting, thanks to Chamberlain’s procedure for allowing the parame- 
ters and individual characteristics to vary over time. 
For expository purposes, consider a panel extending over four pe- 
riods and a model with a first-order lag structure. So we have 
(4)  Y;, = an1  + allyin + 81lXio + 41.6  + ui1  3 
yi2  = a02  + a12yiI  + 812XiI  + 42L + ui2  3 
yi3 = a03  + aII~i2  + 813~;~  + 4d + ui3  >  and 
yi4 = a04 + allyi3 + 814Xi3  + 44.6  + ui4  3 
where  is the coefficient multiplying the individual effect in period 1. 
The model  in equation (2a) implicitly restricts the 4’s to one in each 
period. Because yio  and xi0  are not observed, the equation for yi  I  cannot 
be estimated; it is included here because of  the implication for later 
observations. 
To  test for Granger causality, we estimate the equation (4) jointly 
and determine if the restriction 
(5)  811  = 812 = 813  = 814 = 0 
can be accepted under the F-test.  But the procedure for estimating 
equation (4) is not straightforward. Differencing will clearly not work, 216  Robert E. BaldwidRichard K. Green 
as the individual effects will not disappear. Rather, we must perform 
Chamberlain’s transformation: we multiply each equation for time t by 
(+t-l/+t)  and then subtract the result from the equation for time t +  1, 
yielding 
(6)  Yi2 = (ao~  -  r2) + (a12 + r2)~il 
-  ~Z~IIY~O  + 612xil -  r2811xi0 
+ ui2 -  r2u;l  9 
yi3 = (a03 - r3) + (a13 + r3)Yi2 
-  r3aIZYil + 813xi2 -r3812  xiI 
+ ui3  - r2ui2,  and 
Yi4 = (a04 -  r4)  + (a14  + r4)Yi3 
-  r4al3yi2 + 8IZxi3  -y2811xiZ 
+ ui4 -  r2ui3  , 
where r1 = (+1/+1-  J. We then jointly estimate equation (6) and test the 
hypothesis (5). Now it is apparent why we postponed the discussion 
of instrumental variables: equation (6), the model we wish to estimate 
and use for testing, has some right-hand variables corielated with the 
transformed error term, so we are interested in finding the instruments 
required to consistently estimate the model. 
The natural candidates for instruments are appropriately lagged val- 
ues of x and y. It is therefore clear that not all the equations in (6)  may 
be identified; in fact, in this specific setup, only the equation at time 4 
is identified. The last equation (6) has four right-hand-side variables, 
so four instruments are required. We have four available instruments: 
xi  I,  xi2,  Yi  I,  and Yi2; none of these variables is correlated with the error 
term in  the last  equation of (6). But it  is clear that the other three 
equations may not be identified. Moreover, were we to add any further 
lags,  none of  the four equations could  be  identified.  In general, to 
identify an equation for one time period under an m-order lag structure, 
we must have greater than m  + 3 periods of data available. To  put it 
another way, given that we have eleven years of annual data available, 
the longest lag structure we may try is eight years. 
We  have now described the Chamberlain-Holtz-Eakin  et al. econo- 
metric  model.  It is a model that will test for Granger causality  in a 
panel setup, allowing individual effects to  vary with time and employing 
appropriate lagged variables to instrument out any bias. Following Holtz- 
Eakin, Newey, and Rosen, we now discuss precisely how such a model 
is estimated. 
7.3  Estimation 
The general form of equation (6) is 217  Effects of  Protection on Domestic Output 
n+ I 
Y;r  = a, + c C/rY;.r-/ 
/= I  (7) 
where rr = (+,h  -  I), 
a, =  - rraor-  1  9 
CI~  = rr + alt , 
C/r = a/r - rra/-  1.f-  I  * 
Cm+ 1.r - -rram.r-l  3 
dlr  = 61,  t 
4, = 6/r - rr~/-l,r-l  1 
dm+,.t  =  -rtam.r-I,  and 
- 
vir = ui, - rrui,r-  I  . 
Note that the hypothesis 6,  = 0 is the same in our case as dm = 0 
Introducing additional notation, let 
Y,  = [ylr,  . . . ,  yNr],  where N is the number of four-digit industries, 
and analogously for X,. In our context,  Y is output or employment of 
the industries, and X is some measure of protection. Let 
for all m. 
W, = [l,Yr-l,. . . , Yr-rn-l,xr-l,.  . . ,Xrim  11, 
where m is the number of lags assumed. Wr  is the N  X  (2m + 3) vector 
of  right-hand-side variables in  our general model, and 1 is an N  x  1 
vector of  ones. 
is the N  x  1 vector of  transformed disturbance terms, and 
Pr = [ar,c/r,  . *  *  9  Cm+ ~.r~d/r~  . . 7  dm+  1.r1 
is the (2m  + 3)  x  1 vector of  coefficients for the equations.  So we 
may write equation (7) as 
(8) 
To  combine all the observations, we can stack equation (8). Let 
Y,  = wrpr  + v, . 
y  = [Yh+3,. . . , Ybl, 
P  = [P’m+37 . . .  3  P>l, 
V  = [Vh+3,.  . . , V;],  and 
W = diag[Wh+,, . . . ,  Wb], 218  Robert E. Baldwin/Richard K. Green 
where diag[ ] denotes a block diagonal matrix with the given entries 
along the diagonal. The observations for equation (8) may therefore be 
written 
(9) 
This appears to be a classical simultaneous equation system where 
the equations are indexed by t and the observations by i. In the classical 
system, however,  the same instrumental variables are used for each 
equation. In our approach, the matrix of variables that qualify for use 
as instruments in period t is 
Zr  = [e,YtP2,  . . . , YlrXt-2, . . . ,XI], 
which, of course, changes with t. To allow for different instruments 
for each equation, we chose the matrix of instruments for the system 
in equation (9) to be block diagonal. So we have the matrix 
Z= diag[Z,+,,  . . . ,  Z,]. 
Y = wp + v. 
The orthogonality conditions assure that 
plim,,(Z’V)IN  = 0, 
so Z is the appropriate choice of instruments for equation (9).y 
(10) 
The orthogonality condition assures that GLS estimates of p will  be 
consistent. To  get a GLS estimator, we must have knowledge of the 
covariance matrix of disturbances Z’V.  This covariance matrix, R, is 
given by 
To estimate p, premultiply equation (9) by Z‘ to obtain 
Z’Y = Z’wp = Z’V. 
n = E{Z’VV’Z}. 
Clearly, R must be estimated. To do so, we get a preliminary estimator 
of p by estimating the coefficients of the equations for the time periods 
t using two-stage least squares on the equation for each time period 
alone. Call this  estimator B,. Now  we use this  estimator to form a 
vector of residuals for period t: Vr =  Y,  - W,B,. 
At this point, we depart from the procedure of Holtz-Eakin, Newey, 
and Rosen. In attempting to use their method, we found that in our 
case the difference between the largest and smallest eigenvalues of the 
R matrix is so large as  to render it computationally singular. The method 
we use incorporates a restriction on the relationships of the variables 
across time that allows us to estimate a computationally  nonsingular 
matrix. Because we have N different industries within each time period, 
we have no reason to believe that their error terms are homoskedastic. 219  Effects of Protection on Domestic Output 
We  therefore use White’s (1980) procedure to correct for heteroske- 
dasticity. For each time period t, we estimate a covariance matrix 
where vir is the ith element of  V,  and Zi, is the ith row of Z,. Now we 
reestimate B, for each time period t: 
B,  = [W,’Z,(fl  r)-’Z,’Wf]-lW,’Zr  (LR,)-’Z,’Y,  . 
We  now use the residuals generated from this B, to generate a covari- 
ance matrix h  to use for joint estimation in  the classical three-stage 
manner (see Judge et al. 1982).1° Finally, we may usehto form a GLS 
estimator of the entire parameter vector, B, by using all the available 
observations: 
(12)  B  = [  WTZ(fi)-IZ’W]  -  I W’Z(h)  - ‘Z’Y. 
7.4  Hypothesis-Testing Procedure 
We  wish to determine if  tariff protection “Granger-causes”  output 
in  protected industries. In our model-as  described in equation (7)- 
this means testing whether d,, = 0 for all 1 and t, subject to the provision 
that we have not estimated a model with lag-truncation bias. We follow 
the procedure outlined in Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1985). Let 
(13)  Q = (Y - WB)rZ(h)-’Zr(Y  - WB)/N, 
where the terms on the right-hand side are defined as before.  As N 
grows, Q has a chi-squared distribution. Now let 
(14)  QR  = (Y - WT)’Z(~)-IZ’(Y  - WT)/N, 
where w is the matrix of explanatory variables as transformed by our 
restrictions, and T is the corresponding vector of restricted coefficients. 
QR  is also distributed chi-squared as N grows. By analogy with the F 
statistic in the standard linear model, an appropriate test statistic is 
which has the form of the numerator of the test statistic. The covariance 
matrix of the transformed residuals is by construction an identity ma- 
trix. L therefore has a chi-squared distribution as N grows with degrees 
of freedom equal to the degrees of freedom of  QR  minus the degrees 
of freedom of  Q. When all parameters are identified under both the 
null and alternative hypotheses, the degrees of freedom of  Q and QR 
are equal to the number of  instrumental  variables minus the number 220  Robert E. BaldwiniRichard K. Green 
of  parameters  being estimated.  L therefore  has degrees of  freedom 
equal to the dimension of B minus the dimension of  7. 
7.5  Data and Results 
Data on shipments, imports, and tariff revenues were collected at 
the four-digit SIC level for nineteen two-digit SIC industries for the 
years  1972-82.  Many observations, however, are either missing or 
inconsistent. At this stage, we have been able to construct five panels 
of  consistent data:  four are the two-digit  industries steel, food  and 
kindred products, textiles, and apparel; the fifth is footwear, which is 
part of the two-digit industries leather products and rubber products. 
Information from Hufbauer, Berliner, and Elliott  (1986) on nontariff 
trade barrier (NTB) tariff equivalents in the steel and footwear indus- 
tries is also used. These data were used to estimate models for steel, 
footwear, textiles, apparel, and food and kindred products using tariffs 
alone, and for steel and footwear using tariffs  plus the ad  valorem 
equivalents of NTBs. All data were detrended; the detrended output 
and tariff data are available from the authors on request. 
We  used the general model outlined in section 7.3 to estimate steel, 
food and kindred products, textiles, and apparel; because of the small 
number of  observations on footwear, a restricted form of the model 
was estimated by  restricting all  coefficients to be  consistent across 
time. 
We  chose a lag length of three to estimate the covariance matrices 
for the models. Using these matrices, we performed tests to obtain the 
most parsimonious specifications possible, in order to get the sharpest 
consistent estimates of  coefficients.  In the cases of  steel (both with 
NTBs added and without), food and kindred  products,  textiles, and 
apparel, we were able to specify consistent models with one lag. For 
footwear without NTBs added, we required three lags; for shoes with 
NTBs added, we required two. Guilkey and Salemi (1982) performed 
simulations indicating that in small-sample estimation, short lag lengths 
are less likely to produce errors in hypothesis testing. 
We  estimated equations for whether protection  “Granger-causes’’ 
output for the last four available years. As the discussion on the econ- 
ometric model suggests, we could identify coefficients for the last six 
years, but we wished to “reserve”  data in the event that longer lag 
lengths were required. As we  shall see, this is not the case, and an 
obvious extension is to estimate the data for six years.  We  did, of 
course, use all available data for instruments. 
For the four unrestricted  cases, we estimated nine coefficients in 
each time period-four  lagged values of output, four lagged values of 
tariff  rates  divided  by  imports, and  a constant-yielding  a total of 221  Effects of Protection on Domestic Output 
Table 7.1  Steel without Nontariff Barriers Added 
Q  L  DF  .I cv 
I.m=3  2.24  -  28  37.9 
2.  m  = 2 (given  I)  3.80  1.56  8  13.4 
3.  m  =  I  (given 2)  5.76  1.96  8  13.4 
4.  Exclude protection (given 3)  7.20  1.44  8  13.4 
Notes: N = 25; Q = the test statistic representing the “fit”  of each equation and follows 
a chi-squared distribution (see equation 13); L is the test statistic on the restrictions and 
also follows a chi-squared distribution (see equation IS); DF = degrees of freedom; and 
.I CV is the 10  percent critical value of the chi-squared distribution. 
Table 7.2  Steel with Nontariff Barriers Added 
Q  L  DF  .I cv 
I.m=3  2.32  -  28  37.9 
2.  m  = 2 (given  I)  3.89  I .57  8  13.4 
3.  m  =  1 (given 2)  5.68  1.79  8  13.4 
4.  Exclude protection (given 3)  6.88  1.20  8  13.4 
Notes: See table 7.1. 
Table 7.3  Food and Kindred Products 
Q  L  DF  .I cv 
I.m=3  1.22  -  28  37.9 
2.  m  = 2 (given  I)  2.96  1.74  8  13.4 
3.  m  =  1 (given 2)  4.46  1 .so  8  13.4 
4.  Exclude protection (given 3)  4.73  0.27  8  13.4 
Notes: See table 7.1. N = 37. 
Table 7.4  Textiles 
Q  L  DF  .I cv 
I.m=3  I .86  -  28  37.9 
2.  m  = 2 (given I)  3.27  1.41  8  13.4 
3.  m  =  I  (given 2)  4.79  1.52  8  13.4 
4.  Exclude protection (given 3)  6.41  I .62  8  13.4 
Notes: See table 7.1. N  = 28. 222  Robert E. BaldwinlRichard K. Green 
Table 7.5  A  p  p  a  r  e  I 
~~~~ 
Q  L  DF  .I cv 
I.rn=3  1.77  -  28  37.9 
2.  rn  = 2 (given I)  2.33  0.55  n  13.4 
3.  rn  =  1 (given 2)  3.00  0.67  8  13.4 
4.  Exclude  protection (given 3)  3.51  0.51  8  13.4 
Notes: See table 1.1.  N  = 33. 
thirty-six estimated coefficients. The numbers of instruments for the 
four time periods are 13, 15, 17, and  19, yielding a total of  64. The 
degrees of freedom in these cases are therefore 28. In the restricted 
case of footwear, we estimated a total of seven coefficients, and had 
13 instruments at our disposal, yielding 6 degrees of freedom. In testing 
for lag length and Granger causality, degrees of freedom are equal to 
the number of coefficients we restrict to equal zero. 
After jointly estimating the equations using the three-stage technique 
described above, we obtained the minimized chi-squared test statistics 
(i.e., Q)  presented in tables 7.1  -7.7.  Because inferences about causality 
will be incorrect if the lag distribution is incorrectly truncated, we chose 
critical values at the 10 percent level to determine the correctness of 
lag lengths  rather than  the  standard  5 percent  or  1 percent  levels. 
Tables 7.1-7.7  reveal that for all five industries, we may safely accept 
a lag length of  three.  Moreover, tables 7.1-7.5  reveal that for steel, 
food and kindred products, textiles, and apparel, we may truncate the 
lags to one without fear of lag-truncation bias. For footwear without 
NTBs added, we must use three lags (see table 7.6); for footwear with 
NTBs, we must use two (table 7.7). 
A glance at  the  tables  shows the striking results of  our tests for 
Granger causality.  In  six of  seven cases, our test  statistics, L, for 
barriers having no effect are safely under the appropriate  10 percent 
critical value: in these cases, if  we have prior reason to believe the 
hypothesis that tariff rates do not “Granger-cause’’ output to be true, 
we may reasonably accept that hypothesis. The significance of  these 
Table 7.6  Shoes without Nontariff Barriers Added 
Q  L  DF  .I cv 
I.rn=3  1 .81  -  6  10.6 
2.  rn  = 2 (given 1)  1 I .24  9.43  2  4.6 
3.  Exclude protection (given 1)  3.63  1.82  3  6.3 
Notes: See table 7.1. N  = 5. 223  Effects of Protection on Domestic Output 
Table 7.7  Shoes with Nontariff Barriers Added 
~~~  ~~  ~ 
Q  L  DF  .I cv 
I.m=3  0.58  -  6  10.7 
2.  rn = 2 (given  I)  4.16  3.58  2  4.60 
3. m  =  I  (given 2)  10.35  6. I9  2  4.60 
4.  Exclude protection (given 2)  9.04  4.88  2  4.60 
Notes: See table 7.1. N = 5. 
results is even more clear when one considers that the one case in 
which the test statistic is significant at the 10 percent level (footwear 
with NTBs) is a close call, and that we are using the most parsimonious 
justifiable specifications, which, if anything, would cause us to err on 
the side of rejecting the hypothesis of no effect. 
At the same time, we recognize that the arguments set forth in the 
model rely heavily on asymptotics. These arguments could be legiti- 
mately questioned in  light of our small sample sizes. Moreover, the 
small sizes of our data sets invite speculation as to how powerful our 
tests are. At the same time, because we use panel data techniques, we 
are able to exploit several years of data in order to increase our effective 
sample size. And even keeping these caveats in mind, we believe that 
our results are sufficiently strong to suggest that the inefficacy of pro- 
tection is a proposition with considerable empirical backing." 
7.6  Conclusions 
Evidence from section 203 investigations by the ITC and our econ- 
ometric analysis of the relationship between trade barriers and domestic 
output in five industries lend support to the proposition that protection 
is not an effective means of stimulating domestic output. Various re- 
actions by users and producers of the protected product tend to offset 
its  output-expanding effects. Not  only has the imposition of  higher 
tariffs and more restrictive nontariff trade barriers often produced  a 
disappointingly small output expansion, but in some cases the barriers 
appear to have had no success in accomplishing their intended purpose 
of increasing domestic output or even preventing a further output decline. 
Ironically, recent trade policy changes that enable industries to secure 
import protection sooner and more easily than before tend to make it 
easier for foreign suppliers to avoid reducing exports to the protected 
market. For example, it is politically easier for a government to quan- 
titatively restrict imports of a product from a few foreign suppliers than 
from all foreign suppliers of the product. Yet, the quality upgrading by 
suppliers subject to quantitative restrictions,  these suppliers shifting 224  Robert E. BaldwinIRichard K. Green 
production to noncontrolled countries, and the increase in exports by 
noncontrolled suppliers that is caused by this protection method tend to 
offset the domestic output-expanding purpose of the protection. The use 
of ad valorem tariffs, imposed on an across-the-board basis, would not 
produce these offsetting effects. 
Similarly, defining an industry narrowly  in  product terms enables 
domestic firms producing these items to show serious injury from im- 
ports more easily than if the industry is defined as also including other 
substitute products. But when protection is increased only on the nar- 
row list of  products,  the shift by  users and foreign suppliers to the 
substitute  items  undermines  the  output-increasing  benefits  of  the 
protection. 
The conclusion that protection is not an effective means of remedying 
or preventing injury to an industry from increased imports, of course, 
leaves the question of what means would be effective. There is clearly 
a need for more experimentation with alternative measures, but we are 
inclined to believe that some of the new adjustment-assistance pro- 
posals, for example, those of Lawrence and Litan (1986) and Hufbauer 
and Rosen (1986), are likely to prove more efficacious in dealing with 
the  import-injury  problem than with  protection-especially  the pro- 
posed selective quantitative restrictions. 
Notes 
1. An elasticity of foreign demand for imports of less than unity in absolute 
terms, for example, implies a backward-bending foreign export supply curve 
due to the effect of a high income elasticity of demand in the foreign country 
for its own exports that more than offsets the substitution  and production 
effects associated with a price increase for these exports. Under these circum- 
stances, a tariff can lower the domestic price of imports in the tariff-imposing 
country even if the income elasticity of demand for imports in the tariff-imposing 
country is positive. 
2. See Baldwin 1982, 11 for these conditions. See also Falvey 1979. 
3. Baldwin illustrates hysteresis in trade under imperfectly competitive mar- 
ket conditions  by  assuming a temporary shock to the value of a country’s 
currency, but his model can be used to derive the same outcome as a conse- 
quence of a temporary increase in protection. 
4. If the protection takes the form of quantitative restrictions, the capacity 
of  domestic firms is  more likely to expand and increase their  share of  the 
domestic market after the protection is withdrawn. 
5. Political economy theory (Baldwin 1985) suggests that declining output in 
an industry leads to increased protection by stimulating increased lobbying for 
protection.  In this chapter we are not concerned with this hypothesis. 
6. The injured industry can request continuation of the import relief, or the 
president or the commission  can initiate a commission  study to determine 225  Effects of Protection on Domestic Output 
whether the protection should be removed prior to  the end of the initial period 
of protection. 
7. Not only were duty categories defined in unit-value terms, but the tariffs 
on imports were compound duties, that is, they included both an ad valorem 
and a specific component, so that the rate of protection in percentage terms 
declined as prices rose. 
8. For a proof of this statement, see Sargent  1979. 
9. Holding T fixed, as N goes to infinity. 
10. Our procedure is slightly different from that presented in Judge et al. 
1982 (379-86),  which  has instruments that remain constant across time.  As 
already noted, our instruments change across time. 
11. We also tested for whether protection “Granger-causes’’  domestic out- 
put changes using regressions that included lagged values of import prices as 
explanatory variables.  We collected completely different data series for this 
test:  import prices were taken from BLS import price indexes, and import 
and tariff data were taken from Census Bureau 990 Trade Reports. The data 
were at the three-digit SIC level and were quarterly.  In contrast to the tests 
reported in the text of the chapter, we were unable to pick up any lag structure 
in  the quarterly output data. Because we would  expect to find  a  seasonal 
component in the quarterly output data, we are suspicious of the validity of 
our result-that  protection  did  not  “Granger-cause’’  changes in  domestic 
output-based  on these data. We  will  continue to work with  these data to 
attempt to increase their power, and therefore get more reliable econometric 
results (see Green 1988). 
References 
Aw, Bee-Yan, and Mark J. Roberts. 1986. Measuring quality change in quota- 
constrained import markets: The case of  U.S. footwear. Journal of  Inter- 
national Economics 21  (1/2):45-60. 
Baldwin,  Richard  E.  1986. Hysteresis in trade. Department of  Economics, 
Columbia Graduate School of Business. 
Baldwin, Robert E. 1970. Nontariff distortions of  international trade. Wash- 
ington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
, 1982. The inefficacy of trade policy. Essays in International Finance, 
no. 150. International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton 
University. 
. 1985. The political economy of U.S.  import policy. Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish, and Bert Hansen. 1973. A theoretical analysis  of smuggling. 
Quarterly Journal of  Economics 87:  172-87. 
Chamberlain, Gary. 1983. Panel data. In Z. Griliches and M. Intriligator, eds., 
Handbook of  econometrics, vol. 2. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 
Chang, Eui Tae. 1987. Protective effects of discriminatory quantitative restric- 
tions. Korean Economic Journal  l(1): 15-28. 
Falvey, Rodney E. 1979. The composition of trade with import-restricted prod- 
uct categories. Journal of  Political Economy 87:  I  105- 14. 
Green, Richard.  1988. The inefficacy of  protection.  Ph.D.  dissertation, Uni- 
versity of Wisconsin-Madison. 226  Robert E. BaldwidRichard K. Green 
Granger, C. 1969. Investigating causal relations  by  econometric models and 
cross-spectral methods. Econometrica 37:424-38. 
Guilkey, D. K., and  M. K.  Salemi.  1982. Small sample properties for three 
tests for Granger causal ordering in a bivariate stochastic system. Review 
of Economics and Statistics 64(4):668-80. 
Holtz-Eakin, D., Whitney Newey, and  Howard  Rosen.  1985.  Implementing 
causality tests with panel data. NBER Technical Paper No. 48. 
Hufbauer, Gary C., Diane T.  Berliner, and Kimberly  A.  Elliott.  1986. Trade 
protection in  the United States: 31  Cases. Washington,  D.C.:  Institute for 
International Economics. 
Hufbauer,  Gary  C., and  Howard  F.  Rosen.  1986.  Trade policy for troubled 
industries. Policy Analyses in International Economics, no.  15. Washington, 
D.C.:  Institute for International Economics. 
Judge, G., R. Hill, W.  Griffiths, H. Lutkepohl, and T. C. Lee. 1982. Introduc- 
tion to the theory and practice of econometrics. New York: John Wiley. 
Lawrence, Robert Z., and Robert E. Litan.  1986. Pragmatic approaches for 
preserving free trade. Washington, D.C.:  Brookings Institution. 
Learner, Edward E. 1985. Vector autoregression for causal inference? In Karl 
Brunner  and  Allan  H.  Meltzer,  eds.,  Understanding  monetary  regimes. 
Carnegie-Rochester  Conference  Series on Public  Policy 22:225-304.  Am- 
sterdam: North-Holland. 
Metzler, L. A. 1949. Tariffs, the terms of trade, and the distribution of national 
income. Journal of Political Economy 57 (February). 
Morici,  Peter,  and Laura L. Megna.  1983.  U.S. economic policies affecting 
industrial  trade: A  quantitative  assessment. Washington,  D.C.:  National 
Planning Association Committee on Changing Economic Realities. 
Sargent, T.  1979. Macroeconomic theory. New York: Academic Press. 
U.S. International Trade Commission. Various years. Reports to the president 
on investigation no.  203-1-13 under section 203  of  the Trade Act of  1974. 
Washington, D.C. 
White, H. 1980. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator 
and a direct test for heteroskedasticity.  Econometrica 5(48):817-38. 
Comment  Robert C. Feenstra 
This chapter follows the theme set in  Baldwin’s (1982) essay, “The 
Inefficacy of Trade Policy.”’ The author’s efforts to bring a set of data 
to bear on this theme should be commended. This chapter is divided 
into two parts: the first looking at ITC reports and the second estimating 
the vector auto regressions  (VARs). I found the ITC section helpful, 
but would have also liked to see summary statistics of  the data set. 
Let me suggest that the authors construct unit values and price indexes 
at the two-digit level for each of  their industries. A comparison of the 
unit values and price indexes should show upgrading for imports, fol- 
Robert C. Feenstra is associate professor at the University of California, Davis, and 
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lowing the method of Aw and Roberts (1986). I speculate below as to 
what  the comparison  of unit  values  and price  indexes  for domestic 
output might show. 
Turning to the VARs,  the basic  estimating equation is (7). It is a 
regression of output on lagged output (in the same four-digit industry) 
and lagged protection. If the tariff coefficients are significantly different 
from zero, then we say that tariffs “Granger-cause’’  output. Looking 
at this equation, we could immediately think of also regressing tariffs 
on their lagged  values and lagged  output. This would  be a test of a 
political economy model in which industry conditions lead to protec- 
tion. However, this alternative regression would certainly be subject 
to the Lucas critique, that is, any change in trade policy would affect 
the coefficients of that regression. 
Returning to equation (7),  I discuss the economic model that could 
lie behind this equation and use this model to check the specification. 
Consider a multi-input, multi-output production function of the form 
(C1)  F(Y,, Yf-I,  L,, K,) = 0, 
where y, is a vector of current outputs (e.g.,  various types of steel), 
yr-  I  is lagged output, L, is a vector of variable inputs, and K,  is fixed 
inputs. The firm chooses (yt,  L,) to maximize profits piy, - w:L,  sub- 
ject to equation (CI), which gives 
(C2)  Yr =  Y(Pr,  Yr-1, wt,  Kr)* 
Equation (C2)  is simply the solution for optimal domestic supply, de- 
pending on prices, lagged output, and input prices and quantities. 
Comparing equation (C2) with equation (7), our first observation is 
that the authors have omitted the input prices and quantities from their 
output equation. This omission may not be too serious, since the input 
variables may be rather slow moving. It could be corrected by gathering 
more data. 
A  more serious omission is that equation (C2) includes the entire 
vector of domestic prices pt  needed to predict the output of any single 
four-digit industry. However, the authors include in equation (7) only 
the level of protection in that industry. Thus, an obvious omission from 
equation (7) is the level of international prices in each industry. If the 
application of protection is concurrent with falling international prices 
(which seems likely on political economy grounds), then this strength- 
ened import competition could itself explain why domestic output does 
not rise following the protection. 
A further problem is that the entire vector p, entering equation (C2) 
has been reduced to scalars  xr,  x,-  ,, . . . in equation (7). To understand 
the importance of this, we need to consider the type of protection used 
in these industries. 228  Robert E. BaldwinlRichard K. Green 
First, suppose the protection takes the form of an ad valorem tariff, 
so that p, = po(l + T) where po is the vector of international prices. 
Under fairly weak assumptions (F  homogeneous in  y,), a change in T 
will have an equiproportional effect on each industry output yit.  In this 
case equation (7) is correct, with industry outputs measured in natural 
logs. A change in the level of protection would have the same effect 
on each four-digit industry, measured by the coefficients d,,. 
However, the more realistic case is where imports are constrained 
by some system of quotas. Then p, = po + s,  where po  is international 
prices and s is the vector of  quota rents on each product.  Under a 
quota on physical units (e.g., tons of steel), s would be equal across 
product types (e.g., $10 of  quota rents per ton of  any kind of steel). 
More generally, selective quotas would lead to variations in the quota 
rents, reflected in the vector s. 
A tightening of the quota will  increase the quota rents. However, 
this will not generally lead to equiproportional changes in outputs across 
the four-digit industries. On the contrary, we would expect domestic 
firms to shift supply toward those products whose relative price has 
gone up. When s rises equally across product types, this means shifting 
supply toward  the lower-priced products, or downgrading domestic 
output. This downgrading would occur for exactly the same reasons 
that imports are upgraded (see Falvey  1979): a dollar increase in all 
prices means that the relative price of the more (less) expensive goods 
goes  down (up). It  implies a differential  effect  of  the quota on the 
domestic supplies of each product. 
Looking again at equation (7), we see that the authors are forcing 
protection to have the same effect on each four-digit industry (measured 
by dmt).  This specification cannot capture the differential effects of  a 
quota. I fear this misspecification is an important reason why d,,  is 
estimated  as insignificantly different  from  zero. Thus,  I  would  en- 
courage  the  authors  to  move  toward  another  specification  for 
equation (7), which allows a differential response of domestic outputs. 
They could then test the weaker hypothesis that protection does not 
have an effect on “aggregate”  industry output, while allowing some 
pattern of response at the four-digit level. 
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Comment  Robert M. Stern 
My  comments on the chapter by  Baldwin and Green deal with four 
issues: (1) appropriateness of focusing on the domestic output effects 
of protection; (2) need for more discussion of the different types and 
consequences of protection; (3) use of the VAR model; and (4) selection 
of industries. 
Policy Objectives 
The focus on the domestic output effects of protection needs to be 
clarified and perhaps defended more explicitly in the chapter. Baldwin 
and Green assume that influencing domestic output is the objective of 
the policymakers, which it  may  well  be, but they  could have other 
objectives as well, for example, maintenance of employment, increased 
profitability, and providing more time for firms and workers to adjust 
(including a possible orderly decline in the industry and reallocation 
of resources to other sectors of comparative advantage). 
The assumptions about firm behavior need to be clarified as well. 
That is, does it necessarily follow that protection will lead to increases 
in output in all cases? For example, if protection is viewed by firms as 
temporary, they might choose to diversify into other sectors, change 
the composition of  their output to higher-value-added products, and 
maybe  rationalize  their  production methods  to  become  more  cost- 
efficient. In these circumstances, output might well not increase. 
This issue of firm behavior raises the more general point that firms 
in an  industry may  respond  to protection in different ways and that 
perhaps the effects on profitability could be most important. Thus, for 
example, in the study by Hartigan et al. in the November 1986 Review 
of  Economics and Statistics, the authors conclude (using events anal- 
ysis) that there are perceptible effects of protection on firms as reflected 
in changes in stock prices. (These effects dissipate through time, how- 
ever.) The issue, therefore, is that protection may have distinct effects 
on firms in the protected industry, but these effects may not necessarily 
show up in increases in output. 
Different Types and Consequences of  Protection 
I would also like to have seen in the chapter more discussion of the 
different  kinds  of  protection.  From  previous work  by  Baldwin and 
others we are familiar with the idea that trade policy may not be ef- 
fective for a variety of reasons. The issue then is that some policies 
(for example, global quotas) may be more effective than others (such 
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as selective quotas), and it will  not be  surprising when we note the 
failures involved. 
In their analysis of section 203 cases, Baldwin and Green focus on 
the escape-clause actions that were terminated for one reason or an- 
other. It would also have been interesting to examine those (eight) cases 
in which the ITC recommended that protection be continued. It would 
seem in these cases that protection must have mattered to the firms 
and industries in question and that the removal of protection would 
jeopardize the benefits they had realized. Thus, it is useful to point out 
the various reasons why protection does not work in particular cases. 
But does this mean that it does not  work in all cases? And does it 
matter what kinds of policy (tariffs or quotas) have been used? 
Use of the VAR  Model 
If it is granted that the output effects of protection are an appropriate 
criterion to use for purposes of analysis, the question then is whether 
the use of the VAR  model is the best way to proceed. The model as 
set forth seems oversimplified since it posits a relation between changes 
in protection and output. Are there no other variables that enter? For 
example, changes in imports may affect both the amount of protection 
and output. How then do omitted variables enter into the estimation 
model? 
If one wishes to study the output effects of protection, is there some 
way to select a reference point and ask what the situation would be 
without  protection and, alternatively, with protection? The question 
here is whether protection makes a difference and, if so, how much of 
a difference and for how long. The VAR  model unfortunately does not 
provide this kind of information. 
Selection of  Industries 
Finally, I have some questions about the industries that were selected 
for the econometric analysis. It would have been helpful if  more in- 
formation had been given about the protection experiences of the five 
industries chosen. Presumably, such information is in the data appen- 
dix, but this was not made available. 
The food and kindred products industry was one of  those chosen, 
and I  would be curious to know if  this industry was subjected to in- 
creased tariff protection in the 1972-82  period. Here one can think of 
the  U.S. sugar  restrictions  and  periodic  quotas  on imports  of  beef 
(although these may not have been binding at all times). But these types 
of restrictions are not reflected in the tariffs used in the computations. 
Further, with respect to textiles and wearing apparel, the Multifibre 
Arrangement  (MFA) is obviously an important factor affecting U.S. 
imports and domestic output. Yet, only tariffs were taken into account 
in the estimation. 231  Effects of Protection on Domestic Output 
NTBs  were taken into consideration  in  the remaining two indus- 
tries-steel  and footwear. It would be interesting to determine whether 
protection of steel was essentially selective or  global during the period. 
The “trigger price”  system was operative in the late  1970s and early 
1980s, but it may not have been effective in restraining imports. More 
generally, the U.S.  steel industry was in chronic difficulty during much 
of this period, and protection may have affected only the rate of decline 
of output. Also, some segments of the steel industry, in particular the 
minimills,  have been  highly  profitable, whereas the larger and more 
integrated firms have experienced considerable difficulties. 
When NTBs were taken into account in the case of footwear, this 
was the only instance in which the null hypothesis was almost rejected. 
While footwear had  some special problems because it was only part 
of the relevant two-digit industry and required more lags for estimation 
purposes, it nevertheless raises the question of how important NTBs 
may be with respect to the impact on domestic output in the textile 
and apparel industries. If these obviously important protectionist bar- 
riers were taken into account in these two industries, the conclusions 
reached in the chapter might be changed. But I am not entirely certain 
about this point since the textile and apparel industries may have re- 
sponded to the nontariff protection by altering their product mix and 
rationalizing their methods of production to become more cost-efficient. This Page Intentionally Left Blank